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Following two decades of incessant pressure from American
diplomats, in 1997, the international Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) completed negotiation of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.' The Convention, which became
effective on February 15, 1999, obligates signatories to enact domestic
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1. See generally Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Feb. 15, 1999, 37 I.L.M. I, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Convention on
Combating Bribery].
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legislation criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials.2 Five
other anti-bribery conventions have since come into force. However, the
nearly universal formal acceptance of the principle that overseas bribery
should be criminalized, as demonstrated by the broad acceptance of these
conventions, has done little to reduce corruption. This is likely based in
part on a similarly universal lack of interest in seriously enforcing the laws
implementing these conventions. The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 [note the
formal name of U.K. acts include the year, with no "of." I do not think we
should change the name of their Act], enacted after more than a decade of
debate, delay, and deliberation by Parliament, is the culmination of the
United Kingdom's (U.K.) effort to finally comply with the OECD
Convention.4  Because the Act is a complete revision to all U.K. bribery-
related statutes, it applies to both domestic and foreign bribery.s
This Article will provide an overview of the Bribery Act offenses of
bribing another person, requesting or agreeing to receive a bribe, bribery of
a foreign public official, and, most importantly, the corporate offense of
failure to prevent bribery. As mandated by section 9 of the Bribery Act, the
U.K. Ministry of Justice has published "Guidance about procedures which
relevant commercial organisations can put into place to prevent persons
2. Id.
3. These are the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Council of Europe Civil
Law Convention on Corruption, Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention and Protocol on
Corruption, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption. See Anti-Corruption Conventions and Instruments,
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/globaljpriorities/international-conventions/
conventions _instruments (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). The most important of these is the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, which currently binds 140 states, with eleven others dealing
with ratification. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNODC.ORG,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ signatories.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
4. The United States' effort to eliminate bribery and corruption in international and business
transactions began in 1997 with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which is
enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Commercial
organizations subject to the Bribery Act that have adopted anti-bribery procedures under the FCPA will
already have satisfied some of the Bribery Act's requirements. However, certain of the substantive
requirements of the Act go beyond those required by the FCPA, so companies adhering to the FCPA
must still reevaluate their policies and procedures. See Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office,
Managing Corruption Risk in the Real World (Apr. 7, 2011) available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-
us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-201 1/salans---bribery-act-2010.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2012). See Lista M. Cannon & Richard C. Smith, US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act versus the UK
Bribery Act: a perspective from both sides of the Pond, in SERious EcoNoMIc CRIMES, ch. I1, at 92
(Serious Fraud Office, 2011) available at http://www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-
Economic-Crime.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
5. See LAW CoMMISsIoN No. 313, REFORMING BRIBERY, 2008, H.C. 928, at 137 (U.K.)
[hereinafter LAW COMMISSION NO. 313].
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associated with them from bribing."6  This Article will refer to the
Guidance in addressing the various sections of the Act. We demonstrate
that the overly broad and far-reaching effects of the Bribery Act go too far,
particularly with respect to the corporate offense of failure to prevent
bribery. We will also show that the Ministry of Justice's Guidance fails to
provide useful guidance as to how the Act will be enforced and fails to
reassure the public that such enforcement will not be overly aggressive.
I. BRIBERY ACT: SECTION 1
A. Active Bribery Described
Section 1 sets forth the offense of bribing another person, or active
bribery.
Section 1 prohibits a person-either directly or through an agent-
from offering, promising, or giving an advantage to another.9 This is a
6. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (2010)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE]. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 9 (U.K.). See discussion infra Part V.B.
Kenneth Clarke, Secretary of State for Justice, explained in the Foreword to the Guidance: "In line with
the Act's statutory requirements, I am publishing this guidance to help organizations understand the
legislation and deal with the risks of bribery. My aim is that it offers clarity on how the law will
operate." Foreword to GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2.
7. The authors retain British spelling where the Bribery Act is quoted.
8. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 1 (U.K.). This section provides as follows:
(1) A person ("P") is guilty of an offence if either of the following cases applies.
(2) Case I is where-
(a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person,
and
(b) P intends the advantage-
(i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity, or
(ii) to reward a person for the improper performance of such a function or
activity.
(3) Case 2 is where-
(a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person,
and
(b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.
(4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is
offered, promised or given is the same person as the person who is to perform, or
has performed, the function or activity concerned.
(5) In cases I and 2 it does not matter whether the advantage is offered, promised
or given by P directly or through a third party.
Id.
9. Id.
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general bribery offense, applicable within the United Kingdom and abroad.
Section 1 thus covers domestic bribes, kickbacks, and the like between
private parties, as well as bribes of government officials in international
business.'0 An offense under section 1 is not limited to payments of money,
but includes offers, promises, or gifts of financial or other advantage." One
commits this offense even without actually carrying through with the offer
or promise of a payment or advantage; a simple offer or promise completes
the offense.12 A section I offense also includes indirect payments made
through a third party.' 3 However, the offense is limited to circumstances
where the party making the payment intends the advantage so proffered to
induce the recipient to improperly perform an act or to reward the recipient
for having done so.'4 The offense is also completed where a party offers
the advantage, knowing that acceptance of the advantage would constitute
the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.
The person to whom the advantage is offered is the key distinction
between cases 1 and 2, the situations described in subsections (2) and (3).16
In case 1, it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is
offered is the same person who is to perform, or has performed, the activity;
whereas in case 2, the person whose acceptance of the advantage constitutes
an improper performance must be the same person to whom the advantage
is offered.' 7 Moreover, in case 1, the advantage must be intended to induce
or reward the improper performance of a relevant function or activity, while
in case 2, the acceptance of the advantage itself is the improper
performance." In summary, a person offering an advantage as described in
section 1 is guilty if this was done with the intent to induce the recipient to
improperly act, or reward the recipient for having done so, or where the
recipient's acceptance or agreement is itself improper.'9
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1(2)(a).
12. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 1(3) (U.K.).
13. Id. § 1(4-(5).
14. Id. § 1(2)(b)(i).
15. Id. § 1(2)(b)(ii).
16. Id. § 1.
17. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 1(2) (U.K.).
18. Id. § 1(3).
19. Id. § 1(2)(b).
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B. Relevant Function or Activity and Improper Performance
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act set forth, respectively, the broad range of
activities to which the Act applies and the meaning of improper
performance as used in the Act.20 As stated, the section 1 offense is where
the advantage is intended:
(i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant
function or activity, or
(ii) to reward a person for the improper performance of such a
function or activity [or where]
(a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to
another person, and
(b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage
would itself constitute the improper performance of a
relevant function or activity.2
A relevant function or activity is defined in section 3 to include any
public or business activity performed in the course of employment.22 The
activity must also meet one of three conditions: it is normally expected to
be performed in good faith, is performed impartially, or is performed by a
20. Id. §§ 1(4H5).
21. Id. §§ 1(2)(b),(3).
22. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 § 3 (U.K.). Section 3 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act a function or activity is a relevant function or
activity if-
(a) it falls within subsection (2), and
(b) meets one or more of conditions A to C.
(2) The following functions and activities fall within this subsection-
(a) any function of a public nature,
(b) any activity connected with a business,
(c) any activity performed in the course of a person's employment,
(d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether
corporate or unincorporate).
(3) Condition A is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to
perform it in good faith.
(4) Condition B is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to
perform it impartially.
(5) Condition C is that a person performing the function or activity is in a position
of trust by virtue of performing it.
(6) A function or activity is a relevant function or activity even if it-
(a) has no connection with the United Kingdom, and
(b) is performed in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.
(7) In this section "business" includes trade or profession.
Id.
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person in a position of trust by virtue of performing it.23 Importantly, the
relevant function or activity can be carried out abroad and need not have
any connection to the United Kingdom. 24 However, the measure of what is
improper is determined by U.K. standards, not by those of the foreign
country where the bribing occurs.2 5  Enforcement of this far-reaching
language may well prove controversial as other sovereign nations begin to
feel the effects of this measure.
Section 4 explains that a relevant function or activity is performed
improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation, or if there
is a failure to perform the function or activity, and that failure is a breach of
a relevant expectation.26 Section 5 of the Act elaborates on the term
"expectation" as that term is used in sections 3 and 4.27 This section
clarifies that, for the purpose of sections 3 and 4, "the test of what is
expected is a test of what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would
23. Id. § 3(3)-(5).
24. Id. § 3(6)(a)-(b).
25. See id. §§ 4, 5. This applicability of U.K. standards to transactions occurring in foreign
nations with very different societies and cultures will doubtless trigger accusations of "cultural
imperialism" comparable to those previously raised in connection with application of the FCPA. See,
e.g., Christopher Duncan, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or
Moral Imperialism, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16:1 (2000); Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery:
The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L, 155, 156 (2009); Padideh Ala'I, Legacy of
Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade against
Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 881 (2000).
26. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 4 (U.K.). Section 4 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act a relevant function or activity-
(a) is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation,
and
(b) is to be treated as being performed improperly if there is a failure to perform
the function or activity and that failure is itself a breach of a relevant expectation.
(2) In subsection (1) "relevant expectation" -
(a) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition A or B, means the
expectation mentioned in the condition concerned, and
(b) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition C, means any
expectation as to the manner in which, or the reasons for which, the function or
activity will be performed that arises from the position of trust mentioned in that
condition.
(3) Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising from or in connection
with that person's past performance of a relevant function or activity is to be
treated for the purposes of this Act as being done (or omitted) by that person in
the performance of that function or activity.
Id.
27. Id. § 5(1).
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expect in relation to the performance of the type of function or activity
concerned."28 Section 5 further provides:
In deciding what such a person would expect in relation to the
performance of a function or activity where the performance is
not subject to the law of any part of the United Kingdom, any
local custom or practice is to be disregarded unless it is permitted
or required by the written law applicable to the country or
territory concerned."
Thus, once again, the statute purports to apply U.K. standards to
conduct that occurs in other nations.30
C. The Ministry ofJustice's Guidance on Section 1
The Ministry of Justice's Guidance explains that the section 1 offense
of active bribery applies to "bribery relating to any function of a public
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of a person's
employment or performed on behalf of a company or another body of
persons."3 ' While this explanation is broad in all respects, the situation
most open to prosecutorial discretion-and thus prosecutorial abuse-is
bribery performed "on behalf of a company or another body of persons."32
However, the Guidance does not elaborate on this situation.
The Guidance also presents a scenario that would not, in all likelihood,
implicate section 1:
By way of illustration, in order to proceed with a case under
section 1 based on an allegation that hospitality33 was intended
as a bribe, the prosecution would need to show that the
hospitality was intended to induce conduct that amounts to a
breach of an expectation that a person will act in good faith,
impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. This would
be judged by what a reasonable person in the UK thought. So,
for example, an invitation to foreign clients to attend a Six
Nations match at Twickenham as part of a public relations
exercise designed to cement good relations or enhance
28. Id.
29. Id. § 5(2) (emphasis added).
30. See Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 5(2).
31. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 1 18.
32. Id.
33. The term "hospitality" as used in the Guidance refers generally to business entertainment
expenses that would include such items as meals, travel, and accommodation. Id. 1 26, 27.
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knowledge in the organisation's field is extremely unlikely to
engage section 1 as there is unlikely to be evidence of an
intention to induce improper performance of a relevant
function. 34
It should be noted that the Ministry is careful to state only that such an
invitation would be "extremely unlikely to engage section 1[,]" because
there is "unlikely to be evidence of an intention to induce improper
performance of a relevant function."35  This opinion is certainly not
conclusive, however, because the Guidance is not law, does not have the
force of law, and thus, cannot offer much comfort to those seeking to
determine how to comply with the Act.3 6
II. BRIBERY ACT: SECTION 2
Section 2 of the Act describes the offense of passive bribery, where the
perpetrator requests or agrees to receive a bribe. Under section 2, one
34. Id. 20. Twickenham is the world's largest rugby stadium located close to London.
35. Id.
36. See GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 14.
37. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 2 (U.K.). Section 2 of the Act provides:
(1) A person ("R") is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies.
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other
advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be
performed improperly (whether by R or another person).
(3) Case 4 is where-
(a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage, and
(b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper
performance by R of a relevant function or activity.
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other
advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or another
person) of a relevant function or activity.
(5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting, agreeing
to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or
activity is performed improperly-
(a) by R, or
(b) by another person at R's request or with R's assent or acquiescence.
(6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter-
(a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request, agree to
receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third party,
(b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of R or another person.
(7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or believes that the
performance of the function or activity is improper.
(8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the function or activity, it
also does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the performance
of the function or activity is improper.
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does not need to receive a bribe, but merely ask for or agree to receive it,
and the bribe need not be monetary.38 The same definitions of relevant
function or activity and improper performance found in sections 3 and 4
also apply to section 2.3 As with active bribery, the action must be
40improper, i.e., the actor needs to do or intend to do something wrong.
Moreover, the improper conduct could be intended to be done by a third
party, or a third party could be the source of the bribe.4 1 As one might
imagine, section 2 encompasses a wider range of possible conduct than
does section I and may well be easier to prove from the prosecutor's
standpoint. Moreover, the irony of labeling this offense as passive bribery,
and yet defining the four cases constituting varieties of the offense with the
term "requests," was apparently lost on Parliament.4 2 As Professor Peter
Alldridge, a U.K. authority in this area, has remarked: "Calling it passive
bribery-as do some in international instruments-rather misses [the]
point."43
III. BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS, FACILITATION PAYMENTS,
AND HOSPITALITY EXPENDITURES
A. Section 6: Bribery ofForeign Public Officials
Section 6 of the Act outlines the offense of bribery of a foreign public
official." A foreign public official is defined as one who holds a
Id.
38. Id. § 2(3)(a).
39. Id. §§ 3, 4.
40. Id. § 3(7).
41. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 2(6) (U.K.).
42. Id. § 2.
43. Peter Alldridge, Reforming Bribery: Law Commission Consultation Paper 185: (1)
Bribery Reform and the Law--Again, 2008 CRIM. L. R. 671, 681 (2008).
44. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 6(l)-(4) (U.K.). Section 6 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person ("P") who bribes a foreign public official ("F") is guilty of an
offence if P's intention is to influence F in F's capacity as a foreign public
official.
(2) P must also intend to obtain or retain-
(a) business, or
(b) an advantage in the conduct of business.
(3) P bribes F if, and only if-
(a) directly or through a third party, P offers, promises or gives any financial or
other advantage-
(i) to F, or
(ii) to another person at F's request or with F's assent or acquiescence, and
2012] 331
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legislative, administrative, or judicial position of any kind of a country or
territory outside the United Kingdom, exercises a public function, or is an
official or agent of a public international organization.45 This definition
closely tracks the definition included in the OECD Convention.46 A public
international organization is defined as an organization whose members
include countries or territories, governments of countries or territories,
other public organizations, or a mixture of any of the above.47
The Guidance explains that this standalone offense is committed
where a person offers, promises, or gives a financial or other advantage to a
foreign public official with the intention of influencing the official in the
performance of his or her official functions; the person must also intend to
obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business by
doing so.48 The language "obtain or retain business or, an advantage in the
conduct of business," likewise, carefully tracks the requirement of Article 1
(b) F is neither permitted nor required by the written law applicable to F to be
influenced in F's capacity as a foreign public official by the offer, promise or gift.
(4) References in this section to influencing F in F's capacity as a foreign public
official mean influencing F in the performance of F's functions as such an
official, which includes-
(a) any omission to exercise those functions, and
(b) any use ofF's position as such an official, even if not within F's authority.
Id.
45. Id. § 6(5). Specifically, section 6 provides, in relevant part:
(5) "Foreign public official" means an individual who-
(a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether
appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom (or any
subdivision of such a country or territory),
(b) exercises a public function-
(i) for or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom (or any
subdivision of such a country or territory), or
(ii) for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or territory (or
subdivision), or
(c) is an official or agent of a public international organisation.
Id.
46. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 1, art. 1, § 4(a). For the purpose of this
Convention:
a) "foreign public official" means any person holding a legislative, administrative
or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency
or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international
organization.
Id.
47. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 6(6) (U.K.).
48. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, [21.
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of the OECD Convention.4 9 For this separate offense, offering or paying a
bribe to a foreign public official is criminalized, but as with the FCPA,
receipt of the advantage by the foreign public official is not.50
The Ministry of Justice asserts in the Guidance that an offense under
section 6 has no jurisdictional limit.5 ' A foreign public official includes
anyone, whether elected or appointed, who holds a legislative,
administrative, or judicial position "of any kind of a country or territory
outside the UK" and includes:
[A]ny person who performs public functions in any branch of the
national, local or municipal government of such a country or
territory or who exercises a public function for any public agency
or public enterprise of such a country or territory, such as
professionals working for public health agencies and officers
exercising public functions in state-owned enterprises. 52
Such an official "can also be an official or agent of a public international
organisation, such as the UN or World Bank."5 3
According to the Guidance, sections 1 and 6 "may capture the same
conduct but will do so in different ways."54 The policy underlying section 6
is "the need to prohibit the influencing of decision making in the context of
49. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 1, art. 1, § 1. Article 1 provides, in
relevant part:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a
criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or
give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official....
Id. For the unusual treatment of the phrase "or other advantage" by the United States, which amended
the FCPA to incorporate this phrase following ratification of the OECD Convention, see United States
v. Kay, 513 F. 3d 461 (5th Cir. 2008), one ofjust a handful of cases brought under the FCPA that have
actually been resolved in the federal courts.
50. Id. art. 1.
51. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 122.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
This expands slightly on the text of the OECD Convention, which provides that a
foreign public official means any person holding a legislative, administrative or
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency
or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international
organization.
Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 1, art. 1, § 4(a).
54. GUIDANCE, supra note 7,123.
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publicly funded business opportunities by the inducement of personal
enrichment of foreign public officials or to [sic] others at the official's
request." While such activity is likely to involve conduct amounting to
improper performance of a relevant function or activity, to which section 1
applies, the Guidance explains that section 6 does not require proof of
improper performance or an intention to induce such performance, because
"the exact nature of the functions of the persons regarded as foreign public
officials is often very difficult to ascertain with any accuracy, and the
securing of evidence will often be reliant on the co-operation of the state
any such officials serve."56 Thus, Parliament felt the need to create the
separate, standalone offense of bribing a foreign public official. While the
Guidance states that it is "not the Government's intention to criminalise
behavior where no such mischief occurs, but merely to formulate the
offense to take account of the evidential difficulties referred to above," this
is less than helpful, and in fact, provides no useful guidance at all. 7
B. Facilitation Payments
The Bribery Act also outlawed facilitation payments, small bribes paid
to facilitate or expedite routine government action. The Guidance
provides:
As was the case under the old law, the Bribery Act does not
(unlike US foreign bribery law) provide any exemption for such
payments. The 2009 [OECD] Recommendation recognises the
corrosive effect of facilitation payments and asks adhering
countries to discourage companies from making such payments.
Exemptions in this context create artificial distinctions that are
difficult to enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures,
confuse anti-bribery communication with employees and other
associated persons, perpetuate an existing "culture" of bribery
and have the potential to be abused.
The Guidance also states that these payments could trigger either the
section 6 offense or, "where there is an intention to induce improper
conduct, including where the acceptance of such payments is itself
improper, the section 1 offense and therefore potential liability under
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. 145.
59. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 145.
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section 7."so Thus, Parliament has purported to take a hard line by
outlawing any use of facilitation payments.
The Ministry of Justice's Guidance and commentary from the U.K.
Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the agency that investigates and prosecutes
fraud and corruption,6 state that facilitation or grease payments have
always been prohibited by the OECD Convention.6 2 While it is not within
the scope of this Article to analyze in detail the accuracy of this contention,
there is clear evidence that this statement is wrong. Commentary 9 to the
OECD Convention, as originally published, provides:
Small "facilitation" payments do not constitute payments made
"to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage" within
the meaning of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an
offence. Such payments, which, in some countries, are made to
induce public officials to perform their functions, such as issuing
licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country
concerned. Other countries can and should address this corrosive
phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good
governance. However, criminalisation by other countries does
not seem a practical or effective complementary action.
Thus, as originally interpreted in 1997 by paragraph 9 of the Commentary
to the Convention, facilitation payments did not constitute "payments made
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage," and, thus, were
not considered an offense under the Convention."
The SFO Senior Staff has "stated that a company's policies should
address the possibility of such payments being made, incorporating the
relevant AG and Ministry of Justice Guidance in this regard."' The Staff
explained that:
[T]he SFO takes a sympathetic approach toward "emergency
facilitation payments," and offered an example: a visitor to a
foreign country requires an inoculation and is offered the choice
of paying $5 to be inoculated with a clean needle, or not paying
60. Id. 144.
61. See generally SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
62. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 145.
63. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 1, at 15.
64. Id. at 103.
65. UK Serious Fraud Office Discusses Details ofUK Bribery Act with Gibson Dunn (Gibson,
Dunn, & Crutcher, LLP) Sept. 7, 2010, at 3, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
pages/UKSeriousFraudOfficeDiscussion-RecentlyEnactedUKBriberyAct.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2012) [hereinafter Gibson Dunn].
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and being inoculated with a used needle. They stated that in this
case, prosecution is unlikely if the payment is made.
Likewise, the Ministry of Justice acknowledged that eradicating
facilitation payments will be no small feat:
The Government does, however, recognize the problems that
commercial organisations face in some parts of the world and in
certain sectors. The eradication of facilitation payments is
recognised at the national and international level as a long term
objective that will require economic and social progress and
sustained commitment to the rule of law in those parts of the
world where the problem is most prevalent.
Thus, even now, the Government's position on these payments is not
black and white. It is illegal under the Act to make such payments, except
in emergencies such as the $5 payment to avoid a contaminated needle.
But suppose the price is $100? Is prosecution still unlikely? Is unlikely
comfort enough? And what about the case of a ship loaded with fresh food
which cannot be unloaded without the approval of a local customs official
or health inspector? Will the $5 paid to secure this essential permission,
lest the entire shipment spoil, qualify as an emergency facilitation payment
such that prosecution is unlikely? It is clear that the continued outlawing of
facilitation payments under the Bribery Act will be one of the most difficult
aspects of the new law to deal with.
C. Hospitality Expenditures
With regard to hospitality payments, the Ministry of Justice attempts to
reassure that:
[B]ona fide hospitality and promotional, or other business
expenditure which seeks to improve the image of a commercial
organisation, better to present products and services, or establish
cordial relations, is recognised as an established and important
part of doing business and it is not the intention of the Act to
criminalise such behaviour.69
66. Id.
67. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 46.
68. See Gibson Dunn, supra note 66.
69. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 46.
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However, it is worth noting that the Ministry's attempts to explain what
will and will not be considered bribery in this context simply muddies the
water and do not provide any meaningful, practical guidance. For example,
the Guidance states that in order to amount to a bribe, there must be "an
intention for a financial or other advantage to influence the official in his or
her official role and thereby secure business or a business advantage," but
that "[i]n many cases . . . the question as to whether such a connection
[between the advantage offered and the intention to secure a business
advantage] will depend on the totality of the evidence which takes into
account all of the surrounding circumstances."o
In the Parliamentary consideration of the Bribery Act, obvious
questions were raised regarding hospitality. In a letter from Lord
Tunnicliffe, speaking for the Ministry of Justice during Parliamentary
consideration of the proposed Act, the Government's position was set forth:
We recognise that corporate hospitality is an accepted part of
modem business practice and the Government is not seeking to
penalize expenditure on corporate hospitality for legitimate
commercial purposes. But lavish corporate hospitality can also
be used as a bribe to secure advantages and the offences in the
Bill must therefore be capable of penalising those who use it for
such purposes.
Corporate hospitality would ... trigger the offence only where it
was proved that the person offering the hospitality intended the
recipient to be influenced to act improperly."
One commentator also noted that "(flixing the appropriate borderline
between generous hospitality . . . and the criminal giving and taking of
unconscionable, material advantages on the other, is not easy to capture in
language suitable for forensic use."72 Thus, hospitality may demonstrate an
intention to influence a guest, but not necessarily influence him or her to do
anything improper. But is improper to be determined based upon British
sensibilities? As the examples provided by the Guidance demonstrate,
whether a hospitality payment would be found to be illegal depends heavily
70. Id. Il 27, 28.
71. Letter from Lord Tunnicliffe, Opposition Deputy Chief Whip, to Lord Henley, Minister of
State for Crime Prevention and Anti-Social Behaviour Reduction (Jan. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/letter-lord-henley-corporate-hospitality.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2012).
72. G.R. Sullivan, Reforming Bribery: Law Commission Consultation Paper 185 (2)
Reforming the Law of Bribery LCCP No. 185: Bribery Outside England and Wales; Corporate
Liability; Defences; Consent to Prosecution, 2008 CRIM. L. REV. 687, 687 (2008).
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on context.73 The Guidance thus proves itself to be virtually useless in this
context. The public and company compliance officers will simply have to
wait to see how prosecution of activity involving hospitality payments will
be carried out.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL NEXUS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
In the discussion of the offenses created by sections 1, 2, and 6 of the
Act, the jurisdictional nexus to the United Kingdom is quite evident. The
traditional territorial basis for jurisdiction is also explicitly set out in section
12, entitled "Offenses under this Act: territorial application."
The SFO Senior Staff has explained that the test for jurisdiction is
whether the company in question carries out business in the United
Kingdom, and this is yet another fact-specific inquiry to be made on a case-
73. See, e.g., GUIDANCE, supra note 7, IM 30,31.
74. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 12 (U.K.). Section 12 provides:
(1) An offence is committed under section 1, 2 or 6 in England and Wales,
Scotland or Northern Ireland if any act or omission which forms part of the
offence takes place in that part of the United Kingdom.
(2) Subsection (3) applies if-
(a) no act or omission which forms part of an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 takes
place in the United Kingdom,
(b) a person's acts or omissions done or made outside the United Kingdom would
form part of such an offence if done or made in the United Kingdom, and
(c) that person has a close connection with the United Kingdom.
(3) In such a case-
(a) the acts or omissions form part of the offence referred to in subsection (2)(a),
and
(b) proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in the United Kingdom.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has a close connection with the
United Kingdom if, and only if, the person was one of the following at the time
the acts or omissions concerned were done or made-
(a) a British citizen,
(b) a British overseas territories citizen,
(c) a British National (Overseas),
(d) a British Overseas citizen,
(e) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 was a British subject,
(f) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act,
(g) an individual ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom,
(h) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom,
(i) a Scottish partnership.
(5) An offence is committed under section 7 irrespective of whether the acts or
omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere.
Id.
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by-case basis." The SFO has made it quite clear, however, that it "intends
to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the Bribery Act."" The
SFO has apparently already been approached by U.K. companies
complaining about competitors in foreign countries that are paying bribes,
so one of the SFO's objectives "is to prevent ethical companies from being
competitively disadvantaged by the actions of other companies whether
they are within or outside the UK."" Here, too, the prosecuting authorities'
intent to assert the Bribery Act's vast extraterritorial reach is apparent.
V. SECTION 7: REESTABLISHING BRITISH DOMINION OVER THE PLANET
While the broad reach of the Act's treatment of facilitation payments
and business hospitality is obvious, section 7 of the Bribery Act, Failure of
Commercial Organizations to Prevent Bribery, is by far the most
outrageously overreaching aspect of the Act.18  This provision creates a
separate strict liability criminal offense for a corporation or other entity
subject to this section.79
A. Relevant Commercial Organization
To appreciate the broad extent of the operative provisions of section 7,
which provides that "[a] relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of
an offence under this section if a person ("A") associated with C bribes
another person . . . ," it is necessary to determine what constitutes a relevant
commercial organization and who is a person associated with the relevant
commercial organization. Subsection (5) of section 7 begins its definition
75. Gibson Dunn, supra note 66, at 4.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 7 (U.K.).
79. Id. Section 7 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of an offence under this
section if a person ("A") associated with C bribes another person intending-
(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures
designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct.
(3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another person if, and only if, A-
(a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under section I or 6 (whether or not A has
been prosecuted for such an offence), or
(b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 12(2)(c) and (4) were omitted.
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated with C and see section 9
for a duty on the Secretary of State to publish guidance.
Id. § 7(l)4).
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of a relevant commercial organization, non-exceptionally, to include "a
body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere)," or
"a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere)."so
As with the jurisdictional applicability of sections 1, 2, and 6, this is
traditional territorial jurisdiction. U.K. domiciled entities are subject to the
strict criminal liability of section 7 with only the defense set out in section
7(2).x
The unique aspect of the jurisdictional reach of section 7 appears in
subsection 7(5)(b) and (d).82 In these provisions, Parliament has abandoned
any thought of either territorial jurisdiction or traditional notions of due
process by aiming this strict criminal liability statute at the entire world.
This subsection makes section 7 equally applicable to: "(b) any other body
corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or part of a
business, in any part of the United Kingdom, [or] (d) any other partnership
(wherever formed) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any
part of the United Kingdom."83
To understand how the relevant commercial organization definition
applies in practice, we must consider what these provisions mean.
Certainly, if a commercial organization of any kind carries on a business in
any part of the U.K. Parliamentary power to legislate is well within
traditionally accepted limits so long as "the United Kingdom" has a
reasonable meaning.84 That term is defined in section 12 of the Act as
England, Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland85 and does not include
British overseas territories, such as Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, or the
exotic South Atlantic islands;86 each still maintaining their pink tinge on
detailed world maps. Rather, the potentially overreaching aspect of the
parallel provisions is found in the phrase "which carries on a business, or
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom."87
80. Id. § 7(5).
81. See discussion infra Part V.B.
82. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, §§ 7(5)(b), 7(5)(d) (U.K.).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. See id. § 7(5).
85. Id. § 12(1).
86. See List of Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Nov. 3, 2009, 10:28 AM), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-
documents/treaties/uk-overseas-territories/list-crown-dependencies-overseas (last visited Mar. 10,
2012).
87. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, §7(5) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
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Within the Bribery Act, there is no further explanation of what a part
of a business might entail. In the official Guidance, the Ministry simply
restates the incredibly broad language of the statute:
A "relevant commercial organization" is defined at section 7(5)
as a body or partnership incorporated or formed in the UK
irrespective of where it carries on a business, or an incorporated
body or partnership which carries on a business or part of a
business in the UK irrespective of the place of incorporation or
formation.88
Likewise, in speeches by various current and former officials of the
SFO we find discussion, but no helpful resolution, of this question.8" The
Ministry of Justice did seek to ease concerns by stating:
The Government would not expect . . . the mere fact that a
company's securities have been . . . admitted to trading on the
London Stock Exchange, in itself, to qualify that company as
carrying on a business or part of a business in the UK and
therefore falling within the definition of a 'relevant commercial
organisation' for the purposes of section 7.*
However, Richard Alderman, as head of the SFO-the agency currently
taking the lead on Bribery Act prosecutions-countered with his own view
of the expansive jurisdiction the SFO could have:9'
88. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 34.
89. See, e.g., Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Address at the Financial Crime
Conference (Nov. 29. 2011), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-
speeches/speeches-201 1/british-bankers-association.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); GUIDANCE, supra
note 7, at 2-3.
90. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, T 36.
91. See, e.g., Caroline Binham, SFO Chief Warns of New Global Reach, FIN. TIMES, May 24,
2011, at 4.
Foreign companies with any kind of business link with the UK have been put on
notice by the head of the Serious Fraud Office that they will be fair game once the
biggest overhaul of the nation's bribery laws in a generation comes into force.
Richard Alderman, the agency's director, is charging his investigators with
rooting out bribery anywhere in the world when the legislation is introduced on
July 1. The Bribery Act's sweeping powers mean that companies based overseas
come under the SFO's jurisdiction if they have any business link with the UK,
such as being listed here.
Id.
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Asked whether all companies listed in the UK potentially fall
under the remit of the Bribery Act, [Alderman] said: "Exactly.
You bet we will go after foreign companies. This has been
misunderstood. If there is an economic engagement with the UK
then in my view they are carrying on business in the UK."'
As noted, it is clear that only the English courts can definitively
resolve this uncertainty.93 But where prosecutorial discretion is so
important, it is extremely unsettling to see government spokesmen
expounding inconsistent views on this crucial provision of a broadly
overreaching statute. If a listing on the London Stock Exchange is
economic engagement, what about a credit facility that includes London
banks? What about the occasional sale of a product? These are just some
of the questions prompted by the language of section 7, which have not
been settled by the statutorily mandated Guidance.
B. Adequate Procedures Defense
In an unsuccessful attempt to soften the blow that section 7 levels
against businesses, Parliament spelled out in section 7(2) of the Act the sole
possible defense to the imposition of wholesale corporate liability. The
adequate procedures defense is as follows: "But it is a defence for C to
prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons
associated with C from undertaking such conduct."94
With the establishment of the strict liability section 7 offense, the
prosecutor and the courts of England no longer need to search for and
attempt to prove the controlling mind of a legal entity.95 Indeed, no intent
92. Jonathan Russell, Serious Fraud Office Risks Clash with Ministry ofJustice over Bribery
Act, TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (July 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/bribery-
act/8609486/Serious-Fraud-Office-risks-clash-with-Ministry-of-Justice-over-Bribery-Act.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2012).
93. See, e.g., GUIDANCE, supra note 7, 46. ("The courts will be the final arbiter as to whether
an organization 'carries on a business' in the UK taking into account the particular facts in individual
cases."). Gibson Dunn, supra note 66, at 4.
However, they made clear that the test for jurisdiction is simply whether the
company in question carries out business in the UK. They noted that case law
relating to this question will not necessarily be relevant to determining
jurisdiction, and this will be a matter of fact in each case, clarifying that the SFO
intends to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the Bribery Act.
Id.
94. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, §7(2) (U.K.).
95. The "controlling mind" element of a corporate prosecution under prior U.K. law required
proof that a very senior executive of the defendant corporation actively and knowingly affected the
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or knowledge is required at all for this crime. If a bribe within the very
broad meaning of that term in the Bribery Act has occurred, the corporate
or other commercial entity is guilty.96  To establish this defense the
company must prove that it "had in place adequate procedures designed to
prevent persons associated with [the company] from undertaking such
conduct." 97 However, the term "adequate" is a curious choice here, since
the procedures in place were clearly not entirely adequate, or the bribery
would not have occurred in the first place.
In its Summary of its Recommendations, the U.K. Law Commission,
after considering prior bribery laws and the proposed wholesale revision
thereof which the Commission was endorsing, described the section 7
defense and the guidance required to understand it in the following terms:
In that regard, it will generally be sufficient guidance to those in
a position to make payments to say:
"Do not make payments to someone (or favour them in any other
way) if you know that this will involve someone in misuse of
their position."99
Kenneth Clarke, then Justice Minister, likewise noted in his introduction to
the Guidance:
The question of whether an organisation had adequate procedures
in place to prevent bribery in the context of a particular
prosecution is a matter that can only be resolved by the courts
taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of the
case. 00
The Guidance characterizes section 7(2) as a full defense to a violation
of the strict liability crime of failing to prevent bribery.' The Guidance
explains that "[i]n accordance with established case law, the standard of
proof which the commercial organisation would need to discharge in order
to prove the defence, in the event it was prosecuted, is the balance of
bribe. See, e.g., Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) 170-71 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
96. See, supra Part III.C.
97. GUIDANCE, supra note 7,14.
98. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 (1961).
99. LAW COMMISSION NO. 313, supra note 6, at xvii (U.K.).
100. GUIDANCE, supra note 7,14.
101. Id. 11.
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probabilities." 02 However, these hints are of no help in deciphering what
constitutes adequate procedures.
The Guidance also sets forth six principles that are the criteria to be
used by companies formulating anti-bribery procedures. 0 3  These include
proportionate procedures, top-level commitment, risk assessment, due
diligence, communication, and monitoring and review.'0 While it is not
within the scope of this Article to address each of these principles, it should
be noted again that the Guidance, although mandated by section 9,105 is not
law, does not have the force of law, and merely expresses what the current
Government thinks, hopes, believes, or intends.'06 It cannot be relied upon.
The Courts may find it interesting that the Guidance provides that a
common sense approach should prevail.' Once a prosecutor has made the
decision to proceed under a particular set of facts, however, stale statements
of the intentions of a prior government will provide little protection for the
accused.
C. Person Associated with a Relevant Commercial Organization
Section 8 of the Act defines associated person for the purposes of
section 7:
(1) For the purposes of section 7, a person ("A") is associated
with C if (disregarding any bribe under consideration) A is
a person who performs services for or on behalf of C.
(2) The capacity in which A performs services for or on behalf
of C does not matter.
(3) Accordingly A may (for example) be C's employee, agent
or subsidiary.
(4) Whether or not A is a person who performs services for or
on behalf of C is to be determined by reference to all the
relevant circumstances and not merely by reference to the
nature of the relationship between A and C.
102. Id. 33.
103. Id. 4.
104. See generally id.
105. Section 9 provides, in relevant part, "(1) The Secretary of State must publish guidance
about procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons associated
with them from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1)." Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 9(1) (U.K.).
106. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 7.
107. Id. 35,36.
344 [Vol. 18:2
Bean and MacGuidwin
(5) But if A is an employee of C, it is to be presumed unless the
contrary is shown that A is a person who performs services
for or on behalf of C.1
The potential for expansive use of this definition by SFO prosecutors
is clear. Subsection (4) elaborates by stating that "all the relevant
circumstances" are more significant than the nature of the relationship.10
Yet this makes the term "associated person" even more ambiguous and
significantly expands the egregious overreach of this strict criminal law.
Does associated person include the local FedEx driver who routinely pays
off a policeman at a rural checkpoint in a Central American nation and who
is delivering a package for a company that has recently made a sale in
London? There is no doubt the driver is performing a service for the
company as required by subsection (1).'" Since the capacity in which the
person operates is not determinative, subsection (2) does not aid the
analysis."' Subsection (3) seems satisfied if it can be found that the FedEx
driver is an agent of the company. But this term is not defined in the Act,
and there are no clues explaining how one might be found to be an agent.'" 2
It seems undeniable that under subsection (4), under all the relevant
circumstances, the driver was performing a service for the company.'
Thus, might a nominal bribe to a local policeman or other small facilitation
payment trigger strict corporate criminal liability under section 7?
In sum, it appears to be a wholesale violation of due process to allow
the automatic imposition of criminal liability on a legal entity, particularly
one with no significant connection to the United Kingdom and the entity's
officers. At the time the Government asked the Law Commission to once
again review the laws on bribery, the Commission was specifically
requested to draft a bill that would include recommendations that "are fair
and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act of 1998."l 14 Moreover, Article
6(2) of the European Convention provides that "[e]veryone charged with a
criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
108. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 8 (U.K.). (emphasis added).
109. Id. § 8(4).
110. Id.§8(1).
111. Id. § 8(2).
112. Id. § 8(3).
113. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 8(4) (U.K.).
114. See LAW COMMISSION No. 313, supra note 6, at 14 (U.K.).
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to law.""l5  However, the Act as written obviously contravenes this
mandate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bribery Act of 2010, the U.K.'s attempt to finally comply with the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, goes too far in addressing the United
Kingdom's perceived lack of commitment to outlaw bribery by U.K.
companies at home and abroad. The Bribery Act is a draconian measure
that will prove extremely difficult to enforce, particularly in the areas of
bribery of foreign public officials and failure of organizations to prevent
bribery. Moreover, numerous provisions will be difficult to interpret, and
the Ministry of Justice's Guidance utterly fails to explain how one can
comply with the Act and avoid liability. While it is clear that Parliament
was attempting to craft a zero-tolerance approach to bribery, the current
problems with the Act overshadow this attempt. It remains to be seen how
other nations will respond once they begin to fully comprehend the far-
reaching effects of this law.
115. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(2), Sept. 3, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#Convention (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
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